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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
TORTS-LIDEL AND SLANDER-RIGHT OF PRIvAcy.-The plaintiff, a carpenter
and general contractor, owed the defendant corporation $4.32 for merchandise
sold and delivered to him. The plaintiff failed to answer the statement of account
signed by the defendant. The defendant notified the plaintiff that unless the
account was paid by June 15, 1935, "he was going to collect it." The account was
turned over to a professional collection service for collection. The collection
service listed the name of the plaintiff together with 23 others on a flaming hand-
bill stating the amount of the debt each owed, and all listed accounts were dis-
tributed about the town and offered for sale to the highest bidder. The action
is brought to recover damages for injury to the plaintiffs reputation for credit,
and injury to his feelings for distributing the handbills throughout the city of
his residence. The trial judge overruled the demurrer. On appeal, held, order
reversed; there is no allegation of a loss of credit or other injury to his con-
tracting business and the court does not recognize the facts as constituting an
invasion of the plaintiff's right to privacy. Judevine v. Bensies-Montanye Fuel
& Warehouse Co., (Wis. 1936) 269 N.W. 295.
In the instant case the court points out that no special damages are alleged
in the complaint, so that to constitute a cause of action, for libel, the matter
published must be actionable per se. At common law where the defamatory
words were written or printed no allegation of special damages was necessary.
17 R.C.L. 263. 264. Similarly, where spoken words were defamatory per se, that
is, where the words imputed the commission of a crime, the suffering from a
loathsome disease or the like, no allegation of special damages was necessary to
make out a cause of action. 17 R.C.L. 263, 264. The Wisconsin court holds that
written or printed words are defamatory and actionable per se if they tend to
subject the plaintiff to ridicule or contempt. Scofield v. Milwaukee Free Press
Co., 126 Wis. 81, 175 N.W. 227 (1905). It has been held, as in the principal
case, that when a person's name is published with the amount he owes the pub-
lication is not defamatory. McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. 253, 92 Atl. 135 (1914).
[Quaere: Why is not truth an absolute defense in these cases?] However, the
publication has been held to be defamatory when it sets out that the persons
whose name are listed therein as delinquent debtors are unworthy of credit.
Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac. 575 (1905). Another court
has held that it is not defamatory for one to charge that a debtor has hidden
behind the statute of limitations and refused to pay his bill. Hollenbeck v. Hall,
103 Iowa 214, 72 N.W. 518 (1897). The Wisconsin court has held that the publi-
cation of words imputing nonpayment of debts, want of credit or insolvency
as to merchants, traders and others in business is defamatory. Kay v. Jansen,
87 Wis. 118, 58 N.W. 245 (1894). The plaintiff in the instant case contended
that he also had a right to privacy which the defendant had invaded. The Wis-
consin court has never heretofore considered the question of a right to privacy.
Authorities are definitely divided on the subject. The doctrine is relatively a new
one, said to be non-existant at the common law. Violation of the right to privacy
consists in the interference with another's seclusion by subjecting him to unwar-
ranted and undesired publicity. See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
(1890) 4 HlAR. L. REv. 193. In a case like the principal case the Kentucky court
has held that the advertising of a debt for sale to coerce payment constitutes an
invasion of the right to privacy. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927). The publishing of a person's likeness without his consent may give rise
to a claim for damages if the particular court feels that a person's right to
privacy should be protected against invasion by another. Pavesich v. New Eng-
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land Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). Those are, however,
the exceptional cases. The New York court has enunciated what is probably
the majority rule when it said "* * * the so-called 'right to privacy' has not as
yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine
cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law
by which the profession and the public have long been guided." Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902) : cf. Note
(1929) 43 HA. L. REv. 297. Perhaps the courts feel that any recognition of a
right to privacy would lead to much litigation some of it bordering upon the
absurd. See Robinson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra. The court in the
instant case pointed out that protection against invasions of individuals' rights
to privacy should be prescribed for by the legislature. Cf. N.Y. CIvlL RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50, 51.
EDw J. KuLIG.
